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"Devolution" in Federal Land Law:
Abdication by Any Other Name . . .
George Cameron Coggins*
I.

Introduction

History has come full circle in just fourteen years. In 1981, divesture
and deregulation were the buzzwords in federal land law as Sagebrush
Rebels Reagan and Watt1 took office. That movement to abdicate federal
responsibility for land management, like the Sagebrush Rebellion itself,
failed miserably.2 The wheel turned. Only two years ago, at the 1993
Conference on Public Lands,3 the theme was "ecosystem management," and
the participants reached a consensus that this new wave was inevitable,
even if no one could define exactly what it was.4
Times again changed quickly. The Republican takeover of the House
and Senate in the 1994 elections has alarmed or elated the public land
policy wonks who fear or hope that the old Sagebrush themes have arisen
from history's scrap pile. The 1981 and 1995 situations on the federal lands
are not precisely comparable, however.5 Then, as now, divestiture and
deregulation are fashionable themes of the theorists,6 but "devolution" is in

*Tyler Professor of Law, University of Kansas, A.B. 1963, Central Michigan University;
J.D. 1966, University of Michigan.
This essay is taken from the remarks of Professor Coggins at the Natural Resources
Law Center of the University of Colorado School of Law conference, Challenging Federal
Ownership and Management: Public Lands and Public Benefits (Oct. 11-13, 1995).
1.

Secretary of the Department of the Interior during the Reagan Administration.

2. George Cameron Coggins & Doris K. Nagel, Nothing Beside Remains: The Legal Legacy of James
G. Watt's Tenure as Secretary of the Interior on Federal Land Law and Policy, 17 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 473 (1990).
3. Natural Resources Law Center of the University of Colorado School of Law conference, A
New Era for the Western Public Lands, (Sept. 21, 1993) [hereinafter A New Era Conference].
4. See George Cameron Coggins, Eleven Reasons to Disregard This Commentary on the
Brave New World in Western Public Land Law, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 401 (1994).
5. In 1981, a conservative Republican Administration did battle with a Democratic
Congress; in 1995, the reverse is true.
6. Terry Anderson, Back to the Future: Privatizing the Federal Estate, A New Era
Conference, supra note 3.
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some senses an even more prominent motif in the political and academic
arenas. "Devolution" in general refers to a transfer of regulatory authority
downward, usually from the federal government to the states.7 "Devolution"
in this context basically means transferring authority to make public
resource decisions from the federal land management agencies to local
citizens. Power, thus, is "devolved" upon localities.
Oddly enough, virtually all of the major players in the federal land and
resource drama—with the probable and notable exception of the national
conservation organizations such as the Sierra Club, Natural Resources
Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation, and Environmental Defense
Fund8—seem to favor devolution in one form or another. Privatization
economists,9 ranchers, tree-huggers, sociologists, lumber company
employees, and even some federal land managers recently have asserted the
value of local control over the use of federal lands in the area.10
Philosophically, devolution is closely tied to divestment and deregulation,
but its proponents seem to believe that devolution of management authority
is possible under federal ownership and under existing federal law.11
This essay disputes those conclusions and the premises that
necessarily underlie them. Devolution, as now advocated, is abdication of
legal management responsibilities by federal land managers. The
proposition raises both legal and policy questions, and care should be taken
in separating those questions. Legally, the inquiry focuses on the degree
that current federal statutes allow land management agencies to delegate
their decision-making powers. Politically, the debate is over the desirability
of allowing agencies to do so. This essay concludes that federal law allows
the management agencies wide (and perhaps undue) latitude to structure
their operations, but that the abdication contemplated by devolution
proponents exceeds the limits set by the judiciary.12 It also concludes that,
as a matter of policy, if not politics, devolution/abdication is a terrifically
bad idea from any but the most shortsighted perspective.13

7.

See, e.g., John Pendergrass, You Say You Want a Devolution, Envtl. Forum 8 (Winter 1995).

8. E.g., Chip Dennerlein (National Parks and Conservation Association), Charging
Public Land Users for Minerals, Grazing, and Recreational Uses, A New Era Conference, supra note 3.
9.

E.g., Anderson, supra note 6.

10. A New Era Conference, supra note 3, passim. Whether hardrock miners share
that passion seems unlikely in the wake of California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co.,
480 U.S. 572 (1987) (holding that there was no per se preemption of the California Coastal
Commission's permit system by federal mining law).
11. E.g., Mary Chapman & Mike Jackson, Public-Private Partnership, A New Era
Conference, supra note 3.
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See infra Part II.

13.

See infra Part III.
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The first part of this essay defines the premises on which the debate
should proceed. The succeeding section briefly traces through history some
prominent instances of abdication by all three branches of government in
the public lands sphere. It also examines more closely four specific
examples in which land management agencies intentionally abdicated their
statutory responsibilities, and the three-year period in which Interior
Secretary James Watt attempted to do so on a wholesale basis. The final
section harps on the damage done by abdication/devolution in the past as a
strong argument for avoiding such damage in the future.
II.

The Premises Underlying Resource Allocation Decisions On The
Federal Lands

Except for asserting that local citizens will make "better" decisions than
professional land managers—an assertion disputed below14—devolution
proponents seldom spell out in any detail the premises upon which their position is
based. While they also frequently claim that federal ownership is inherently "A Bad
Thing,"15 and that federal land management reeks of overbearing, incompetent
colonialism,16 the western taste for hyperbole should be disregarded and the real
reasons examined. All of the real legal and political premises upon which modern
public land law is founded cut against the devolution notion.
The beginning often is a good place to start. In the beginning, the Constitution of
the United States vested legislative power in the House and Senate, judicial power in a
Supreme Court and such other courts as Congress may create, and executive power in a
President.17 This simplistic rendering ought to have real consequences. Article IV of the
Constitution assigns Congress - not the President, and certainly not the Bureau of Land
Management - the power to make needful rules respecting the territory or other property
of the United States.18 That power is plenary and preemptive;19 the United States remains
a sovereign even when it acts as a landowner.20 It is for Congress, as trustee, to say
whether the lands should be disposed of, retained, protected, or exploited.21

14.

See infra Part III.

15. Richard Stroup & John A. Baden, NATURAL RESOURCES: BUREAUCRATIC MYTHS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (1983).
16. Remarks of Sen. Hatch, 125 Cong. Rec. 22640-41 (1979) (quoted IN GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS,
CHARLES F. WILKINSON & JOHN D. LESHY, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 35 (3d ed. 1993)).
17.

U.S. Const.

18.

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

19.

Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976).

20. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911) (holding that Congress
determines how the public lands of the nation, held in trust, are to be administered).
21.

Id. at 536.
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Several related principles bear repeating. First, the United States, not
the individual western states, bought, conquered, or stole the present federal
lands. Second, they are owned by the United States in trust for all of the
people in the country (and, increasingly, in the world), not just for the
souvenir sellers in Cody, Wyoming,22 or the mining claimant marijuana
farmers in California,23 or the county commissioners in Garfield County,
Utah.24 Third, Congress has determined, somewhere along the historical line,
that all of these federal lands should remain federal because they serve some
important national purposes.25 These premises are beyond reasonable dispute.
They also are more than mere junior high civics maxims. They reflect other
premises that are integral to American national life. Such hoary notions as
•
this is a government of law, not of men; or
•
the ends do not justify the means;
are exactly the sorts of propositions that devolution proponents usually
ignore. The public lands are public. They are the property of all of the people,
not just those who live in their immediate vicinity.26 They are national
assets, not local storehouses to be looted in the deregulation riots.
Federal land management may well be economically inefficient, as the
rightist economists claim, but that fact has no relevance except in ethereal
policy terms. The Framers of the Constitution intentionally created a highly
inefficient form of government because they knew that efficiency can be
merely a synonym for despotism. American constitutional law is heavily
procedural because the Framers recognized that ends do not justify means.
Public land management does not necessarily have to be inefficient as a
matter of economic theory, but Congress has chosen to require a great many
procedural safeguards such as environmental evaluation27 and land use
planning.28 Whether or not undue expense and frustration result, the most
appropriate response to the complaint of inefficiency is: "so what?"

22.

See NWF v. NPS, 669 F. Supp. 384 (D. Wyo. 1987).

23.

See People v. Wilmarth, 132 Cal. App. 3d 383 (1982).

24.

Comm'r Louise Liston, remarks at A New Era Conference, supra note 3.

25. Federal Land Policy & Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1988),
starts with a catchall retention clause: "The Congress declares that it is the policy of the
United States that—(1) the public lands be retained in Federal ownership. . . ."
26. This proposition often is at the unstated core of the debate: many westerners
regard adjacent federal lands as their own property, even though legal and moral support
for this assumption is wholly lacking.
27. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1988). See,
e.g., California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982).
28. E.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-14 (1988); 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (1988). See George Cameron
Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management IV: FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple Use
Mandate, 14 Envtl. L. 1 (1983).
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Jim Huffman and others call the federally-owned lands the "political
lands,"29 and of course that description is accurate. The corollary some seek
to draw from that notion is that politics (or "raw politics"30 to some) is a
positive evil to be avoided at all costs. That corollary is hypocritical
academism at its worst. Politics and law in a democratic republic are simply
the means by which this nation transacts public business of all kinds.
Politics, properly understood as the use of policy to make positive law, is
not only the normal mechanism for resolving public land policy disputes, it
is an essential means. Neither economics nor the real sciences can answer
questions of values. Biological sciences cannot tell us how much wilderness
is enough, and economists cannot calculate whether the money spent to
save bald eagles was worth it.
The final premise, that the current political climate is not a good
reason for land managers to devolve their authorities onto local citizens, is
somewhat more debatable. At this writing, Newtoid legislators have
introduced dozens of bills which, if enacted in their totality, would cause
public land law as we know it to regress about a century: disposition would
be a main priority; logging could proceed at the logger's will; mining and
grazing would be dominant, unregulated uses; protective land classifications
would be extinguished; endangered species could fend for themselves; and
pollution would come back into vogue as a necessary evil.31
Predicting legislative actions can be hazardous to one's prophetic
reputation, but the scenario proposed by Newtie and the Congressional
Blowfish is unlikely to become reality. The question of federal land
divestiture has been endemic and epidemic for more than a century. The
current balance, in which small scale divestiture is offset by smaller scale
acquisition, represents a politically acceptable consensus that will not be
overturned lightly.32 In terms of deregulation, John Leshy noted long ago
that the strongest force in modern public land law is inertia; it is simply
much easier to block reform (in any direction) than it is to achieve it.33 Thus,
the Chicken Little reaction is at best premature.
Only Dr. Pangloss or the abysmally ignorant could believe that this is
the best of all possible federal land worlds, and that no reform would be

29. James Huffman, The Inevitability of Private Rights in Public Lands, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev.
241 (1991).
30.

Anderson, supra note 6.

31. Many of the proposals are listed in James Huffman, Public Land Policy is Ripe for
Change, A New Era Conference, supra note 3.
32. See generally GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW ch. 8 (1990).
33. John D. Leshy, Sharing Federal Multiple-Use Lands, in RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS
235, 254 (1984).
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availing.34 The new/old ideas coming from the radical rightists should
therefore be welcomed as providing an opportunity for all to reexamine
basic premises, assumptions, priorities, and philosophies. If history is a
guide, however, radicals of any stripe cannot win rational debates.
III.

A Brief History of Governmental Abdication of Management
Responsibilities on the Federal Public Lands

Abdication is simply buck-passing. It occurs when branches of
government act irresponsibly, a not uncommon phenomenon. Congress, of
course, often prefers to avoid hard questions that could cause political
backlash. That is one reason why federal public land law suffers from such
gobbledygook statutes as the Multiple-Use, Sustained Yield (MUSY) Act35
that use all the right words to say not much of anything at all.36 The MUSY
Act and similar legislation is a congressional abdication of its responsibility
to make basic resource allocation decisions by delegating them to
supposedly expert, but certainly unelected, public land managers without
any real guidance or standards.
Congress can abdicate in this fashion only because the Supreme Court
abandoned the constitutional requirement that Congress cannot delegate
its basic legislative authority.37 In recent years, some Supreme Court Justices
also have sought to abdicate their responsibility to ensure the executive
branch acts within the law. The Court has not adopted Justice Scalia's
executive nullification theory38 outright, but a narrow majority in a few cases
has advanced it indirectly through doctrinal reinterpretation in seemingly
neutral areas such as standing and ripeness.39 These instances of
congressional and judicial abdication are "legal" because the Court says they
are. The next step on the irresponsibility spectrum—delegating power from
federal agencies to private, interested citizens or local officials—is not
necessarily legal.

34. See George Cameron Coggins, Commentary: Overcoming the Unfortunate Legacies of
Western Public Land Law, 29 Land & Water L. Rev. 381 (1994).
35.

Multiple-Use, Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1988).

36. This writer once tried to read the MUSYA as meaning something other than a
standardless delegation, but neither courts nor agencies have agreed. See Coggins &
Glicksman, supra note 32, at ch. 16 and authorities cited therein.
37.

See, e.g., South Dakota v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995).

38. Justice Scalia has argued, evidently seriously, that the executive branch should
be free to ignore statutory requirements with which it is in political disagreement.
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 895 (1983).
39. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. NWF, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)
(examining the sufficiency of affidavits by respondent members to confer standing).
490
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Neither is it original. Agency or departmental abdication of statutory
responsibilities has a long and inglorious history. In the 19th century,
localities invented dozens of ways to cheat the United States out of lands
and resources, from claims clubs to railroad subsidiary corporations and
from "rubber 40s" to perjury and bribery.40 All of these were possible only
because they had local approval and because the responsible federal
officials turned blind eyes to these perversions of the land laws. The old,
unspoken premise—that it is perfectly okay to steal, cheat, lie, etc. so long
as the government is the faceless victim—along with the idea that
westerners deserve something for nothing, is at the bottom of the current
renewed call for abdication, privatization, and decentralization.
In this century, professional management agencies succeeded the old General
Land Office, and instances of abdication multiplied. The Bureau of Reclamation
long turned a blind eye toward those farmers routinely violating the acreage and
residency requirements of the Reclamation Act.41 The National Park Service, though
directed to preserve park wildlife for future generations, not only allowed ranchers to
eradicate predatory species, it actively assisted them.42 The Fish and Wildlife Service
on occasion has preferred local use priorities to the welfare of wildlife on national
wildlife refuges.43 The Forest Service, after World War II, abdicated its independence
to clearcutting lumber companies and timber dependent communities.44 The
Bureau of Land Management neither regulated destructive mining practices nor
much curtailed destructive overgrazing.45 Abdication—agency refusal to perform its
statutory duties—is a constant temptation to all parts of government when the
answer dictated by law is unpopular with local constituents.
Unlike congressional or judicial abdication, however, the failure of agencies to
do their legal jobs may provide dissenters with some judicial remedies. Prediction is
difficult because the judicial record is mixed, and the cases tend to be circumstancespecific. The remainder of this section surveys four notable instances in which
federal land management agencies arguably abdicated their responsibilities and the
efforts of Secretary Watt to abdicate departmental duties wholesale.

40.

See generally PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968).

41. See may Kelley, Staging a Comeback - Section 8 of the Reclamation Act, 18 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 97, 105 (1984); Hamilton Candee, The Broken Promise of Reclamation Reform, 40 Hastings
L.J. 657, 661 (1989).
42. E.g., GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & PARTHENIA BLESSING EVANS, Predators' Rights and
American Wildlife Law, 24 Ariz. L. Rev. 821 (1982).
43. E.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 455 F. Supp. 446 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that Fish
and Wildlife regulations permitting power boating, motorless boating, and water-skiing in a national
wildlife refuge as non-interfering was an arbitrary and capricious determination).
44. E.g., West Virginia Div., Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d
945 (4th Cir. 1975).
45.

E.g., Coggins, supra note 28.
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A.

National Park Service

Redwood National Park, as originally created, was a hodgepodge of
formerly state and federal parcels. Clearcutting on adjacent lands harmed
the new Park aesthetically and physically. The general congressional
mandate to the NPS is preservation of park resources for future
generations,46 but that statute does not mention threats to those resources
from other lands. The Redwood Park Act, however, authorized the Interior
Secretary, in his discretion, to take a variety of actions to abate such
threats.47 Instead of doing so, the Secretary commissioned a series of
studies to stall and then refused to act on the studies' conclusions that
action should be taken. The Sierra Club, claiming that the NPS inaction was
an abdication of its preservational duty, sued to force action.
The district court agreed with plaintiff, Sierra Club.48 It ruled that the
statutes, when read in light of the Secretary's public trust duties, required all
reasonable efforts to preserve the park;49 damage to park resources was evident
and largely uncontested. The court entered a mandatory injunction requiring
the NPS to initiate a series of actions to alleviate the harm.50 The Park Service
did so, but the other entities whose cooperation was necessary (Office of
Management and Budget, the State of California, Congress, and the timber
companies) refused to go along.51 The court finally dismissed the action,
whereupon Congress decreed the purchase or condemnation of the lands where
the offending activities were taking place.52 In sum, the court ordered the
agency to cease abdicating its responsibilities, but the judicial remedy was futile
because it depended on third party cooperation that was not forthcoming.
B.

Fish and Wildlife Service

The Ruby Lake National Wildlife Refuge in Nevada encompasses a
shallow lake that provides breeding habitat for many avian species. In 1978,
local politicians prevailed upon departmental superiors to open Ruby Lake

46.

16 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).

47.

Id. § 79(c), (e).

48. Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (Sierra Club
brought an action to obtain judgment directing the Department of Interior to use its powers to
protect Redwood National Park from damage allegedly caused or threatened by logging operations.
The court held review was permissible and denied defendant's motion to dismiss.).
49. Id. at 95-96; cf. Daingerfield Island Protective Soc'y v. Babbitt, 823 F. Supp. 950, 955
(D.D.C. 1993), aff'd in part, 15 F.3d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (affirmative duty to safeguard NPS units).
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50.

Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 395 F. Supp. 284, 294 (N.D. Cal. 1975).

51.

Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1974).

52.

Id. at 175-76.
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to virtually unlimited power boating, despite staff dissent that the
recreational activity would be extremely harmful to nesting waterfowl. In
effect, the FWS abdicated its responsibility for wildlife welfare to local
political and popular desires.
The reviewing court twice enjoined the effectiveness of the regulations
allowing power boating on Ruby Lake.53 The 1962 Refuge Recreation Act
requires a secretarial finding that a recreational use will not unduly interfere
with basic refuge purposes before such a use may be allowed.54 No such
finding had been made. The court went further to opine that the Secretary
could not, under the law, take into account or balance political or economic
factors in making the finding, and that the burden was on the Secretary to
show statutory compliance not on the challenger to demonstrate
noncompliance.55 In this case, the court had no difficulty remedying the
abdication of statutory authority and responsibility because a standard
negative injunction served that purpose.
C.

National Forest Service

The federal implied reserve water rights doctrine provides that when a
federal parcel is reserved for a particular purpose, the United States also
impliedly reserves sufficient unappropriated water in the reservation to
serve the purpose of the reservation.56 National forests are entitled to water
rights that enable the Forest Service to carry out the dual but narrow
purposes of the 1897 Organic Act.57 The questions arose in Colorado whether
further reservation of an area within a national forest as a wilderness area
carried with it an additional implied water right, and whether, if it did, the
Forest Service was obligated to assert such rights in pending water rights
adjudications. The Forest Service (pursuant to an edict from the

53. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 11 ERC 2098, 455 F. Supp. 446 (D.D.C. 1978)
(Wildlife organizations brought an action against the Secretary of the Interior claiming
regulations which allowed power boating in refuge violated Refuge Recreation Act. The
court held the regulations did violate the Act and were inconsistent and interfered with
refuge's primary purpose.).
54.

15 U.S.C. § 460k (1988).

55.

Defenders of Wildlife, 11 ERC at 2101.

56. E.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (holding that when the U.S.
Government reserved a cavern as a national monument, the government also acquired by
reservation water rights in unappropriated appurtenant water sufficient to maintain the
water level of the underground pool).
57. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (holding that in setting aside
the Gila National Forest from other public lands the U.S. Government did reserve water
out of the Rio Mibres to preserve timber and maintain water flows but not to further
aesthetic, recreational, wildlife-preservation, and stock-watering purposes).
493
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conservative Administration) denied both that such rights existed and that it
had to assent and protect such rights even if they were implied.
The district court had little difficulty concluding that wilderness
designation was a separate reservation that carried implied water rights with
it.58 This was an important holding inasmuch as the preservational purpose
of wilderness designation could require all unappropriated water to be
reserved. The district court, however, had more difficulty in fashioning an
appropriate remedy. The court rejected application of the public trust
doctrine, instead requiring the agency to submit a report on possible ways
to meet its responsibilities. The first report was rejected as grossly deficient,
but the court refused to order the Forest Service to enter litigation.59
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the litigation for lack of
ripeness.60 The highly confusing opinion in essence decided that suit on
these questions was precluded until a distinct, serious threat to wilderness
water resources was actually demonstrated. Several parts of the appellate
court's opinion strongly hinted that the lower court was correct on the
merits of the existence of the right.61 Because the lawsuit was dismissed for
technical reasons, the question whether the agency unlawfully abdicated its
duty to preserve resources under its jurisdiction remains unresolved.
D.

Bureau of Land Management

The case most on point in any discussion of devolution/abdication is
the 1985 "Ramirez" decision on the validity of the BLM's proposed
"Cooperative Management Agreement" (CMA) program.62 The Watt regime
promulgated regulations which effectively would have delegated virtually all
livestock management authority to selected rancher-permittees. This was
done in concert with a variety of other regulatory changes also aimed at
abdicating BLM control of the public lands. The reviewing court remanded
most of the proposed regulations for procedural reasons. As to the CMA
program, however, the court addressed the substantive merits and flatly
rejected the BLM's abdication attempt as a gross departure from its
pertinent statutes. In words that still resonate, the court concluded:
Permittees must be kept under a sufficiently real threat of cancellation
or modification in order to adequately protect the public lands from
overgrazing or other forms of mismanagement. Any other interpretation

58. Sierra Club v. Block, 615 F. Supp. 44 (D. Colo. 1985), 622 F. Supp. 842, 851 (D.
Colo. 1985).
59.

494

Sierra Club v. Block, 661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987).

60.

Sierra Club v. Yeuter, 911 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1990).

61.

Id. at 1413, 1414.

62.

See NRDC v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848, 871-77 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
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of congressional intent is inconsistent with the dominant purposes
expressed in the [statutes]. It is for Congress and not defendants to
amend the grazing statutes. In the meantime, it is the public policy of
the United States that the Secretary and the BLM, not the ranchers,
shall retain final control and decision-making authority over livestock
grazing practices on the public lands.63
That is what the law should be. Other courts, however, including the Ninth Circuit,
tend to be far more deferential to agency discretion as to appropriate management
means.64 The Reno case is perhaps the worst of this genre.65 Still, all courts will recognize a
line beyond which agencies cannot go in their quests for devolution.
E.

Secretary Watt's Wholesale Devolution

The period 1981-1983 saw a concerted effort by Secretary of the Interior James
G. Watt to divest, deregulate, and devolve. He was unsuccessful in the great majority
of important instances.66 Congress halted some proposals, such as coal lease sales67
and oil and gas leasing in wilderness areas.68 None of Mr. Watt's reactionary ideas
were adopted by Congress. Courts sidetracked many more Watt initiatives, from
ANWR opening69 to shooting wolves,70 from establishing an oil refinery on a
wilderness wildlife refuge71 to halting parkland acquisition,72 and from revoking

63. Id. at 871; cf. Anacostia Watershed Soc'y v. Babbitt, 871 F. Supp. 475 (D.D.C.
1994) (transfer to jurisdiction enjoined).
64.

E.g., Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1979).

65. NRDC v. Hodel, 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1987) (NRDC challenged BLM policy
decision to eschew the use of available data for purposes of setting grazing levels on
lands in Reno Area. Ninth Circuit held that BLM need not determine grazing capacity for
each allotment to satisfy statutes.).
66.

See generally Coggins & Nagel, supra note 2.

67.

See NWF v. Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145 (D.D.C. 1983).

68.

See Pacific Legal Found v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1981).

69. See Trustees for Alaska v. Watt, 690 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding district
court conclusion that Secretary Watt improperly transferred lead responsibility for studies
involving ANWR from USFWS to USGS).
70. See National Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985) (regulations
permitted sport hunting and trapping of eastern timber wolf held to be illegal).
71. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Clark, 606 F. Supp. 825 (D. Alaska 1984) (Secretary
attempted to transfer a wilderness area to Alaska native corporations in exchange for land
interests in two other wilderness areas. Court held that Secretary's discretion was reviewable
and here, Secretary's "Public Interest Determination" suffered from serious errors of judgment
and misapplication of law. The land exchange was invalid.).
495
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withdrawals73 to ignoring environmental evaluation.74 The question in most cases
was whether the Interior Department had followed the substantive and procedural
requirements of the relevant statutes. Usually, the answer was no.
Several conclusions may be derived from these and many other instances.
First, the federal public land statutes often suffer from a severe lack of precision,
detail, and management guidance. Barring resurrection of the nondelegation
doctrine,75 however, Congress cannot be forced to make the hard choices.
Second, courts often are loathe "to say what the law is"76 in this area. This
aversion to judicial duty is a consequence, in part, of the opacity of the statutory
law, which necessarily delegates wide discretion to the managing agencies,77 but
it also stems from historical assumptions and premises, now long outmoded,78
and from radical judicial theories that alone cannot stand the light of day.79 In
other words, courts for whatever reason are very reluctant to reverse
administrative determinations on public resource questions.
Third, judicial deference to agency discretion only goes so far. Courts
in most cases will not allow land management agencies to ignore or
circumvent clear statutory directives. The Monongahela,80 Snail
Darter,81Wilderness Review,82Minnesota Wolf,83and AMA II84 decisions can be added

72. See generally Robert L. Glicksman & George Cameron Coggins, Federal Recreational
Policy: The Rise and Decline of the LWCF, 9 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 125, (1983).
73. See NWF v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (environmental group
challenged actions by Secretary of Interior withdrawing protective restrictions from 180
million acres of federal lands. Court upheld injunction against Secretary's conduct of this
program.), rec'd on other grounds, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
74. See, e.g., NRDC v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848, 871-877 (E.D. Cal. 1985) ("Experimental"
program allowing selected ranchers to graze livestock on public land in manner they deemed
appropriate violated NEPA, APA, and other federal or state environmental laws).
75. The Eighth Circuit recently held that a statute giving the Interior Secretary
unqualified power to acquire land "for Indians" was an unconstitutional delegation. South
Dakota v. Dep't of the Interior, 69 F.3d 878, 882-83 (8th Cir. 1995).
76. This is "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department."
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
77.

See, e.g., Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 807, nn. 11, 12 (9th Cir. 1979).

78. See, e.g., NRDC v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045, 1054 (D. Nev. 1985) (elimination of
grazing "unthinkable"), aff'd, 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1987).
79.

E.g., Scalia, supra note 38.

80. West Virginia Div., Izaak Walton League v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975)
(holding that contracts allowing clear cutting of timber on National Forest lands violated
provisions of Organic Act requiring individual tress be marked).
81. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (holding that ESA gave protection to small fish,
halting construction of a dam by TVA).
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to the list of cases in which courts thwarted agency abdicatory efforts. So
long as the federal laws delegate decision-making authority to federal
administrative entities, and not to local citizens' groups, devolution of that
authority to those groups will remain arbitrary and unlawful.
IV.

Conclusion: Is Devolution Good Political Policy?

The negative answer to the legal question whether devolution is
possible under existing law does not necessarily answer the policy question
whether it should occur. As the preceding part illustrates,
devolution/abdication is hardly a novel idea: it has been a common
phenomenon on the federal public lands almost since the beginning of
nationhood. This concluding section argues that the effects of
devolution/abdication almost always have been bad in one or more
respects, and that there is little or no reason to believe that modern
devolution would have better results.
Proponents claim that resource allocation by local residents instead of
professional land managers will result in "better" decisions. "Better" in this
context, could mean anything from economic efficiency to environmental
safeguards to blissful unanimity (or least consensus) to lack of red tape to
more prosperity to anything else. However "better" is defined, history
provides strong evidence that the premise is untrue.
Whenever western economic interests were able to control local
resource allocation and use, they chose to "cut and run" rather than to use
self restraint in the interests of conservation and sustainability. Westerners
are no better than the rest of us: profits now seem always to take precedence
over health of the natural systems that provide those profits. Why are the
Nation's public lands now characterized by:
•
torn up deserts?
•
increasing numbers of threatened and endangered species?
•
polluted and depleted waterways?
multiplying instances of outright poisonings as at Kesterson
•
National Wildlife Refuge?
•
loss of primeval forests?
ugly clearcut swathes and patches?
•

82. Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (district court held that
Secretary's attempt to withdraw lands from the wilderness inventory if the U.S. did not
hold subsurface mineral rights was improper and tracts of less than 5000 acres subject to
non-impairment management even if withdrawn from inventory).
83.

Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608.

84. American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt, 543 F. Supp. 789 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (In California
Desert Conservation Area Plan, Secretary of Interior ignored statutory requirements in
designation of motorized vehicle routes. Plaintiffs granted declaratory and injunctive relief.).
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•
severely diminished grazing capacity?
invasions of pest species?
•
•
destruction of fishing industries?
•
lost access opportunities?
violence against federal employees?
•
•
economic speculation and concentration?
•
destruction of free-flowing rivers?
destruction of wildlife habitat?
•
•
and many more such problems?
The answer of course is that in most cases the local people did it, and
the managing agencies did not do their jobs. Defacto devolution benefits
only a few, and only briefly. Local westerners are concerned first and
foremost with whose ox is to be gored. When the property in question is
public property, all people who want to be heard regarding the use or
disposition of public land, should be. But the person or body who ultimately
decides should not have a personal ox on the firing line. Chicken coops
should not be regulated by foxes.
No resource allocation mechanism ever will be perfect because people
and politics will never be perfect. The disputes involved in federal public
land law seldom can be resolved without legal coercion, from federal
administrative agencies in the first instance and thereafter by courts and
congress. Blind belief in discussion and consensus is just a phoney
substitute for a real system of decision making. And, in every such decision,
there will be at least one loser—no amount of rhetoric can change that fact.
Instead of allowing federal land managers to devolve their authorities and
responsibilities onto local citizens' councils, a far better balance will be
achieved if only legislators would legislate, judges would judge, and
managers would manage in accordance with the law.
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